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THE TREATY MAKING POWER AND THE
EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFECT OF THE
CONSTITUTION: REID v. COVERT
AND THE GIRARD CASE
SEDGWICK W. GREEN*
Two major cases concerning the relaticnship of treaties to the
United States Constitution were decided by the Supreme Court in
1957: Reid v. Covert' and Wilson v. Girard.' While these cases
appear to answer some long debated questions in the field of treaty
law, they create a host of new problems which still await resolution.
In the preparation of this article it had been hoped that consideration
of these two cases in the light of the precedents would permit some
useful generalizations concerning the law in this field. However, it
must be concluded that the law as to the relationship of treaties to
the Constitution is still too much in the formative stages to allow
any really definitive treatment. Thus, this article will do no more
than attempt to analyze the relevant cases and make some sugges-
tions as to the trend which future decisions ought to take.
I. THE RECENT CASES
Unquestionably, the more important of the two cases was Reid v.
Covert. This case appears to have established the principle that
treaties are subject to constitutional limitations, even though there
was no opinion in which a majority of the Court concurred. The
point was squarely made only in the opinion of Justice Black, which
was concurred in by three other Justices.3 Although neither the two
concurring Justices nor the two dissenters 4 discuss this issue, they
do not take exception to such a conclusion, and the proposition
seems inherent in the concurring opinions of Justice Frankfurter 5
and Justice Harlan.6
The question as to the relationship of treaties and the Constitu-
tion perhaps arose from the peculiar wording of Article VI, under
which the laws of the United States are required to be made in pur-
suance of the Constitution in order to be the supreme law of the
land, whereas treaties are not explicitly so limited.7 Concern over
*Member of the New York and District of Columbia Bars.
1. Decided together with Kinsella v. Krueger, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
2. 354 U.S. 524 (1957).
3. The Chief Justice, Justice Douglas and Justice Brennan.
4. Justice Frankfurter and Justice Harlan concurred; Justice Clark and
Justice Burton dissented; and Justice Whittaker (lid not participate.
5. 354 U.S. at 41.
6. Id. at 65.
7. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
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this question was aggravated by the decisions in Missouri v. Hol-
land' and United States v. Pink. In Missouri v. Holland, the Court
rejected a constitutional attack on a treaty with Canada for the
protection of migratory birds. This attack was based on the theory
that the treaty was contrary to the tenth amendment ° since the
protection of migratory game was not one of the powers granted
to the federal government. In the Pink case, an executive agreement
was held to overrule a state determination of the ownership of
assets, with a situs within the state, of a nationalized Russian
corporation.
In Reid v.* Covert, Justice Black explained that the peculiar
wording of Article VI was intended only to validate "agreements
made by the United States under the Articles of Confederation, in-
cluding the important peace treaties which concluded the Revolu-
tionary War. . . ."" and not to relieve all treaties of the constitu-
tional limitations. He distinguished Missouri v. Holland on the
ground that absent some specific constitutional prohibition, the
treaty making power represents a delegation by the states and the
people to the national government so that the tenth amendment is
no barrier.:2 The Pink case was not discussed. 13
Thus, Reid v. Covert has laid to rest the contention that treaties
and executive agreements are not subject to any constitutional
limitations whatever, and therefore endanger the American con-
stitutional system.' 4 But with this problem solved, the case pro-
ceeds to raise two further difficulties, and these it copes with much
less satisfactorily. These two problems are: (1) the extent to which
the Constitution applies beyond the boundaries of the United States,
a problem that obviously becomes acute as to treaties and executive
agreements regarding American interests overseas; and (2) the
extent to which the grant of treaty-making power 15 may proprio
vigore validate a treaty which conflicts with some other portion of
the Constitution. It is with these two problems that the rest of this
paper will be concerned.
8. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
9. 315 U.S. 203 (1942). This concern was undoubtedly the source of
much agitation for the Bricker Amendment
10. Reserving to the states or the people all power not delegated to the
national government.
11. 354 U.S. at 16-17.
12. In Missouri v. Holland, Justice Holmes also dwelt on the exceed-
ingly transitory nature of a state's interest in migratory birds. 252 U.S. at 434.
Today it could not seriously be denied that the commerce clause provides
ample basis for federal action, even absent the treaty power.
13. The case is discussed at notes 93-100 infra, and related text.
14. See Cowles, Treaties and Constitutional Law: Property Interfer-
ences and Due Process of Law (1941).
15. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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As to the first of these, Reid v. Covert re-opened to dispute an
area of constitutional interpretation whose broad outlines, at least,
had been considered firmly established. For until the decision in
Reid v. Covert, commentators had generally agreed, on the basis
of more than ample precedent,' that only those portions of the
Constitution involving fundamental human liberties, perhaps those
applied to the states under the due process clause of the .fourteenth
amendment,17 were applicable beyond the "incorporated terri-
tories"18 of the United States. 9 However, four of the eight Justices
sitting in Reid v. Covert rejected this approach:
While it has been suggested that only those constitutional rights
which are 'fundamental' protect Americans abroad, we can find
no warrant in logic or otherwise for picking and choosing among
the remarkable collection of 'Thou shalt nots' which were ex-
plicitly fastened on all departments and agencies of the Federal
Government by the Constitution and its Amendments.20
And, as will be developed subsequently, the question as to whether
the grant of the treaty-making power could overcome other provi-
sions of the Constitution was almost totally ignored.
The decision in Reid v. Covert naturally increased concern as to
the validity of provisions in various agreements, relating to the
stationing of American forces overseas, providing under certain
circumstances for trial by the receiving country of American service-
men and others accompanying the American armed forces. 21 These
doubts were quickly dispelled by Wilson v. Girard, in which the
Court upheld against constitutional attack the waiver by the
United States pursuant to Article XVII of the Japanese Adminis-
trative Agreement of its claim to jurisdiction over a member of
16. See notes 30-57 infra, and related text.
17. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
18. Beyond the District of Columbia and the outer Continental Shelf,
(see 67 Stat. 462 (1953), 43 U.S.C. § 1333 (1952)) only Hawaii, (see 31 Stat.
141 (1900), as amended 48 U.S.C. § 495 (1952)) ; and Alaska, (see 37 Stat
512 (1912), 48 U.S.C. § 23 (1952)) have specifically been "incorporated" by
Act of Congress. In Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 306 (1922), the Court
indicated that it would in the future look for some specific statutory evidence
of incorporation of overseas areas.
19. See, e.g., Sutherland, The Flag, The Constitution and International
Agreements, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 1374, 1380-81 (1955) ; Green, Applicability of
American Laws to Overseas Areas Controlled by the United States, 68 Harv.
L. Rev. 781, 781-82 n.4, 788 n.51 (1955).
20. 354 U.S. at 8-9.
21. Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Re-
garding the Status of Their Forces, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S. Treaties & Other
Int'l Agreements 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846 (henceforth NATO Status of Forces
Treaty), Art. VII; Administrative Agreement under Article III of the
Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan, Feb. 28,
1952, 3 U.S. Treaties & Other Int'l Agreements 3341, T.I.A.S. No. 2492
(henceforth Japanese Administrative Agreement) Art XVII.
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the United States armed forces and his surrender to the Japanese
for trial in a Japanese civilian court.2 2 The Court held that there
was no "constitutional . . .barrier to the provision as applied
here. ' 23 Since Girard was an enlistee rather than a draftee, 24 the
argument could not be made that the government through the selec-
tive service process was compelling a citizen to subject himself
to judicial procedures which did not conform to the safeguards
established by the Constitution.25 The failure of the Court to rely
on this point, and the unanimity of the opinion seem to make it
highly unlikely that this distinction would produce a contrary result
in a case involving a draftee. 2
While the Girard case and the congressional attacks on status
of forces agreements have concentrated on the provisions dealing
with criminal jurisdiction,27 the questions of the effect of the Con-
stitution on treaties and executive agreements and its extraterri-
torial applicability bear on other aspects of the status of forces
22. Article XVII of the Japanese Administrative Agreement incorpo-
rates by reference the NATO Status of Forces Agreement provisions
dealing with criminal jurisdiction.
23. 354 U.S. at 530.
24. See Appendix A to the Opinion of the Court, 354 U.S. 531 at 543.
25. While numerous safeguards are provided by the status of forces
agreements (see NATO Status of Forces Treaty Article VII, Sections 8, 9),
there is no guarantee of a grand or petit jury or of the privilege against self-
incrimination or a public trial. The first three are specifically said in Palko v.
Connecticut not to be "of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty"
and are therefore not guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment in trials by
states. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323-26 (1937), and cases there
cited. But perhaps to some extent Palko, as well as Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46 (1947) and Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908), have im-
pliedly been overruled by Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350
U.S. 551 (1956). However, the fact that a result like Slochower was reached
in Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957), where the privilege was not
claimed indicates that Slochower depends on other factors. Palko does not
discuss the right to public trial.
26. Any argument that Girard as an enlistee had waived his rights
would seem equally applicable to the dependent who voluntarily accompanied
her serviceman husband overseas in Reid v. Covert.
27. See, e.g., Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
84th Cong., 1st Sess., on H.J. Res. No. 309, passim; H.R. Rep. No. 678, 85th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
28. See NATO Status of Forces Treaty, Article VIII and Japanese
Administrative Agreement, Article XVIII. The issue may also be relevant to
international agreements entered into by the United States for settlements
of claims of American nationals against foreign governments as a result of
nationalization or expropriation; e.g., Agreement between the Governments
of the United States of America and the Federal People's Republic of Yugo-
slavia Regarding Pecuniary Claims of the United States and Its Nationals,
July 18, 1948, T.I.A.S. No. 1803. See Oliver, Executive Agreements and
Enawtions from the Fifth Amendment, 49 Am. J. Int'l L. 362 (1955). Until
passage in 1957 of amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 Stat.
1060 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1952), provisions in status
of forces agreements covering conditions of employment of receiving country
nationals by the visiting forces might also have created constitutional ques-
tions. See Green, op. cit. supra note 19, at 806-07.
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agreements, notably those dealing with settlement of claims.2 8 These
constitutional problems are illustrated by a case in the Court of
Claims, Seery v. United States.2 9 A castle owned by an American
national was utilized during the occupation of Austria by the
United States Army as an officers' club. On the termination of the
American occupation, the United States made a lump sum payment
to the government of Austria for all claims arising out of damage
to or use of Austrian property during the occupation. It was agreed
that all claimants could proceed only against the Austrian Govern-
ment and not against the United States. The Court of Claims held
that this agreement was contrary to the just compensation clause in
the fifth amendment, and that therefore the agreement was ineffec-
tive to bar the plaintiff from maintaining her claim against the
United States.
That this holding of the Court of Claims is not limited to claim-
ants who are American nationals is shown by an earlier Court of
Claims case, Turney v. United States.30 In this case the United
States had mistakenly sold as surplus some classified radar equip-
ment in the Philippines. When the vendee sought to re-sell the
equipment to the Chinese Nationalist Government, the United
States induced the Philippine Government to place an export em-
bargo on the equipment so that the seller could only deliver it to the
United States. At the time of this action ard of the delivery of the
property to the United States, title to the property was in a
Philippine corporation. Nonetheless the Court of Claims held that
the action of the United States Government, including its action in
inducing the Philippine Government to impose the export embargo;
constituted a taking requiring payment by the United States of just
compensation under the fifth amendment.
II. THE HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS
In view of the contemporary importance of the extraterritorial
applicability of the Constitution and its evident relation to treaties
and executive agreements entered into by the United States, it
would be well to consider the long line of cases dealing with this
subject which form the background of the equally divided Court in
the Covert case. As will be seen, these cases also shed some light on
the extent to which the treaty making power may provide an affirma-
tive basis for upholding a treaty under constitutional attack.
The question of the geographical appEcation of the Constitu-
tion first arose with respect to the territories in the American con-
29. 130 Ct. C1. 481, 127 F. Supp. 601 (1955).
30. 126 Ct. C1. 202, 115 F. Supp. 457 (1953).
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tinent.31 On some occasions the Court held that the Constitution was
squarely applicable ;32 at other times it held that the Constitution
did not apply directly to the territories, although its provisions for
protection of fundamental personal rights were applied by infer-
ence.3 3 As was noted in American Publishing Co. v. Fisher,3 ' statu-
tory provisions for government of the territories provided for ex-
tension to the territories of the laws of the United States or the
Constitution and laws of the United States so that the statements
in favor of automatic applicability of the Constitution, absent such
statutes, were generally dicta.
At about the same time that the Court was approaching the last
of the cases concerning the western territories it began to be faced
with problems relating to the applicability of the Constitution be-
yond the continental United States. The first of these cases, and
one that was to become a critical precedent in Reid v. Covert, was
In re Ross. 5 This case involved an attack on constitutional grounds
on a criminal proceeding before an American consul in Japan pur-
31. The issue seems first to have appeared in American Insurance Co. v.
Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828). In this case the Court held that Article
IV, Section 3, authorizing the Congress to govern the "Territory or other
Property" of the United States authorized the action of Congress in estab-
lishing in Florida after its cession by Spain courts not based on Article III
of the Constitution. The subject of constitutional application to the territories
became a major political issue prior to the Civil War. While two somewhat
differing interpretations of the matter are presented in Downes v. Bidwell, 182
U.S. 244, 275-76, 295-97 (1901), in general it seems fair to state that, perhaps
surprisingly, it was the civil libertarians who in general opposed automatic
extension of all the provisions of the Constitution to the territories. The
reason for this situation was that those who favored the extension of slavery
to the territories contended that the Constitution recognized slavery and that,
since the Constitution was, in their view, applicable to the territories, Con-
gress could not by legislation forbid slavery in any of the territories, and thus
deprive the inhabitants of their property interest in slaves. The Dred Scott
case, Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), appeared to decide
the issue in favor of the theory that the Constitution of its own force applied
to all territory acquired by the United States since the time of the adoption
of the Constitution. Insofar as the Missouri Compromise may be said to have
been implementing the Louisiana Purchase, the Dred Scott decision has been said
to be an early recognition of the fact that treaties are subject to constitutional
limitation. See, Cowles, op. cit. supra note 14, at 176. However, this expression
of opinion by the Court must be classed as dictum, and it was hardly very
popular authority after the Civil War. As a result, the problem of applicability
of the Constitution to the Western territories continued to be agitated in
numerous cases coming before the Court.
32. E.g., Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898).
33. Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 44 (1890). Perhaps
this "inference was drawn from the principle of international law which the
Court had enunciated in other cases to the effect that, when jurisdiction over
territory passes from one sovereign to another, the prior law remains in
effect except to the extent contrary to fundamental personal rights. Chicago,
R.I. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U.S. 542, 546 (1885) ; Ortega v. Lara,
202 U.S. 339, 342 (1906) ; Vilas v. Manila, 220 U.S. 345, 357 (1911).
34. 166 U.S. 464 (1897).
35. 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
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suant to agreements with Japan providing for such extraterritorial
jurisdiction. The Court held flatly that "the Constitution can have
no operation in another country." 36 But it should be noted that the
Court had an additional basis for its decision. It found a positive
constitutional basis for the creation of the consular court in the
clauses relating to the treaty making power.3 7 The Court viewed
these clauses as vesting in the federal government constitutional
power to execute treaties on any subject which is a proper one con-
cerning which to negotiate with foreign governments. In view of
the prevalence of agreements providing for extra-territoriality, the
treaty making power was therefore found to provide a suitable con-
stitutional basis for the establishment of consular courts.38
The issue again appeared with the vast expansion of America's
overseas interest brought about by the Spanish-American War. In
Downes v. Bidwell, 9 an Act of Congress 4 1 establishing duties on
goods being transported from Puerto Rico to the United States in
order to finance the local government of Puerto Rico was attacked
as in contravention of clause 1 of Article I, Section 8 of the Con-
stitution, which requires that "all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall
be uniform throughout the United States" and also as repugnant
to the export clause of the Constitution. 41 The Court held that the
duty was not unconstitutional, but the five-to-four majority was
unable to join in any Opinion of the Court.42
Justice Brown appears to take the position that while certain
fundamental human rights are protected against United States
Government action beyond those territories that have been incorpo-
rated into the United States, the rest of the Constitution is not so
applicable. 3 Justice Gray apparently largely joined in this opinion.4 4
The opinion of Justice White appears to differ from that of Justice
Brown more in form than in substance. Justice White takes the
position that the federal government cannot exercise any power
other than through the Constitution. Thus, instead of emphasizing
constitutional inapplicability, Justice White looks to the Constitution
36. Id. at 464.
37. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2; art. IV, § 2.
38. 140 U.S. at 463.
39. 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
40. The Foraker Act, 31 Stat. 77 (1900).
41. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 5; see 182 U.S. at 248, 288.
42. While the official reports carry at the top of the pages containing
the opinion of Justice Brown, who announced the judgment of the court, the
caption "Opinion of the Court," Justice White, Shiras, and McKenna, three
of the five member majority, make it clear that they do not join in the reason-
ing of Justice Brown. 182 U.S. at 287. A note by the reporter also makes it
clear that there is no opinion of the court. 182 U.S. at 244 n.1.
43. See particularly 182 U.S. at 276-77, 279-84.
44. Id. at 344, 345.
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for a specific mandate for action and finds it in Article IV, Section 3
which vests in Congress power to dispose of and make all needful
rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property of
the United States. He also quotes with approval the reference in
Ross to the treaty making power as a foundation for action abroad.4 5
The basic distinction between the two opinions is that Justice White
appears to view Justice Brown as holding that there is some source
of power in Congress or the president to regulate unincorporated
possessions or otherwise act outside the boundaries of the United
States which does not derive from the Constitution; but Justice
White himself recognizes that certain provisions of the Constitution
may not be applicable to such authority, even though it has a
constitutional source.4 6
The insubstantiality of the practical distinction between the posi-
tion of justice White and that of Justice Brown is made clear by the
concurrence of White, joined in by Justice McKenna, in Hawaii v.
Mankichi,47 in which it was held that the provisions of the fifth
and sixth amendments of the Constitution concerning grand and
petit juries were not applicable to the Territory of Hawaii after its
annexation, but prior to its incorporation by statute.
Subsequent cases arising from insular possessions of the United
States appeared to make it clear that large portions of the Constitu-
tion were inapplicable beyond the incorporated territories,48 but that
fundamental liberties provided for in the Constitution were pro-
tected even in unincorporated possessions.
4
9
45. Id. at 294. It must be noted that in a further discussion of the treaty
power, Justice White makes it clear that in his view the treaty making power
is not dominant over the rest of the Constitution but must be harmonized
with it, even though he would recognize that by the treaty making power an
area may be kept unincorporated and therefore its inhabitants denied some
of the benefits of the Constitution. See 182 U.S. at 312-14.
46. 182 U.S. at 289, 294. The lines of demarcation between the two
opinions seem to be based on the pre-Civil War controversy discussed supra at
n.31. It is submitted that in view of Justice White's willingness to find
authority in the treaty making and management of territory clauses of the
Constitution, and in view of the existence of other general powers such as
the president's authority as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and the
president's broad authority in the field of foreign affairs, Article II, § 2, cls.
1, 2, 3, Article II, § 1, cl. 1, the distinction between the position of Justice
White and that of Justice Brown, rooted as it is primarily in long dead politi-
cal controversy, is more apparent than real.
47. 190 U.S. 197, 218 (1903).
48. Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904) (trial by jury not re-
quired in criminal libel case in Philippines) ; Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S.
298 (1922) (trial by jury not required in criminal libel case in Puerto Rico).
49. Soto v. United States, 273 Fed. 628 (3d Cir. 1921) (trial without
confrontation or cross examination of opposing witnesses violates Constitu-
tion) ; see Balzac v. Porto Rico, supra note 48, at 312-13. This is perhaps as
much a matter of international as constitutional law. See Chicago, R.I. & P.
Ry. Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U.S. 542, 546 (1885) ; Ortega v. Lara, 202 U.S. 339,
342 (1906) ; Vilas v. Manila, 220 U.S. 345, 357 (1911).
(Vol. 42:825
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Similar problems relating to constitutional applicability have
arisen in the administration of occupied territory which the United
States did not intend to retain. In the first Neely v. Henkel case,50
Congress had by statute specifically provided for extradition to
foreign countries or territories or parts thereof occupied by the
United States. Neely objected to extradition on the ground that
he was being turned over for trial without constitutional safeguards.
Despite the fact that the demanding authority was in fact the United
States Military Government, the Court dismissed Neely's objection
with the observation that the constitutional safeguards "have no
relation to crimes committed without the jurisdiction of the United
States against the laws of a foreign country."5' 1 The Court went on
to say that the person extradited could not complain if he were re-
quired to submit to a mode of trial "as the laws of that country
may prescribe for its own people, unless a different mode be pro-
vided for by treaty stipulations between that country and the United
States." The opinion was unanimous.
A closer examination of the status of an American occupation
court was contained in Madsen v. Kinsello.52 This was a capital
case in which a wife had murdered her husband, who was a soldier
in the American Occupation Forces in Germany. The Court upheld
the conviction by the occupation court. The Court noted that the
tribunal did not provide for a jury, but stated that this was irrelevant
in the instant case because cases arising in the land and naval forces
do not require a grand or petit jury. 3 Thz! Court indicated that
both courts martial and military commissions or tribunals had juris-
diction to try the wifeA4 Justice Black alone dissented, but on a
ground that hardly presaged his opinion in Reid v. Covert. He
argued that the occupation courts were established by the president
rather than by Congress and therefore were in violation of Article I
of the Constitution which conveyed all legislative power to Con-
gress. 5
50. 180 U.S. 109 (1901).
51. 180 U.S. at 122.
52. 343 U.S. 341 (1952).
53. Id. at 360, n.26.
54. However, it must be noted that the wife appeared to concede that
a court martial would have had jurisdiction, (see 343 U.S. at 345), and was
only protesting against the use of the occupation courts. Nonetheless, the
Court's willingness to uphold application of the occupation tribunal to the
wife, although there was no statute, (see Black's di3sent, 343 U.S. at 371-72),
providing for military tribunals any of the numerouis safeguards provided by
the Uniform Code of Military Justice, (70A Stat 36, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940(Supp. IV, 1956)), for the court martial in the Covert case. See e.g., Article
31 (b) (warning before official interrogation) ; Article 32 (representation and
right to cross-examine at investigative phase comparable to grand jury) is in
striking contrast to Covert.
55. 343 U.S. at 371.
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Johnson v. Eisentrager5 6 also sheds some light on the status of
occupied territory. The opinion of the Court went down on the
theory that German nationals, tried by military commission for con-
tinuing to assist Japan against the United States after the German
surrender, were not entitled to turn to United States courts to seek
habeas corpus, since the right to constitutional guarantees of an alien
depends on territorial presence, 57 and even when there is such
presence, an enemy alien has only the right to test his enemy alien
status. However, Justice Jackson went on to reject the theory
that the fifth amendment is applicable to all persons of whatever
nationality and wherever located when officials of the United States
act.
Justice Black, joined by Justices Douglas and Burton in dissent,
did not disagree with this latter point: "Probably no one would
suggest, and certainly I would not, that this nation either must or
should attempt to apply every constitutional provision of the Bill
of Rights in controlling temporarily occupied countries."58
III. THE FATE OF THE PRECEDENTS IN THE RECENT CASES
How are these precedents dealt with in Reid v. Covert? Justice
Black, who appeared to take the position that all parts of the Con-
stitution are applicable abroad,59 must be said to overrule In re
Ross.60 He seeks to distinguish the Insular Cases because "they in-
volved the power of Congress to provide rules and regulations to
govern temporarily territories with wholly dissimilar traditions and
institutions whereas here the basis for governmental power is
56. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
57. The doctrine of territorial presence creates an interesting problem
as to foreign nationals present in the United States under a status of forces
agreement permitting court martial by the foreign government for crimes
committed within the United States. Are such persons, despite the agreement,
entitled to constitutional (or state) court trials because of their territorial
presence? Colonel Howard Levie, Chief, International Affairs Division, Office
of The Judge Advocate General, Department of the Army, advised the author
by letter of January 15, 1958, that his office knew of no case in which such
a claim had been made.
58. 339 U.S. at 796-97. Nonetheless there has been some indication that
some portions of the Constitution are applicable in occupied territories. In
Best v. United States, 184 F.2d 131, 138 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 939(1950) it was said that the fourth amendment to the Constitution was appli-
cable to a search by Army officers in occupied territory, and, that the lack
of a judicial officer authorized to issue a search warrant did not render
the fourth amendment inapplicable, but merely caused there to be a different
test as to what was reasonable. Best, however, involved an American citizen.
59. Perhaps he merely parallels his position, in opposition to Palko, on
the scope of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Black's dissent in Adamson
v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947), where he applies only the first eight
amendments and other similar specific prohibitions.
60. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 12 (1957). See 42 Minn. L. Rev. 490
(1958).
(Vol. 42:825
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American citizenship.' '61 Madsen v. Kinsella is summarily dismissed
in a footnote:
[That case] is not controlling here. It concerned trials in enemy
territory which had been conquered and held by force of arms
and which was being governed at the time by our military forces.
In such areas the Army commander can establish military or
civilian commissions as an arm of the occupied area, whether
they are connected with the Army or not.
62
Justice Frankfurter and Justice Harlan face a different problem
in dealing with the precedents in their separate concurrences. They
both hold that, at least in a capital case involving a dependent
civilian accompanying the armed forces,6 3 due process require-
ments are not sufficiently met by a trial by court martial."4 Starting
with this conclusion, the treatment of Ross and the In.ular Cases
is not surprising. Ross is treated as a reasonable solution of the
nineteenth century concern over the administration of justice with
respect to westerners in "non-Christian" countries. The Insular
Cases lend support for the proposition that due process is the issue;
insofar as they find a jury and a grand jury unnecessary whereas
Justices Frankfurter and Harlan find one necessary, the distinction
is given that a jury was alien to the traditions of the inhabitants of
the insular possessions to whom the laws primarily would apply, and
that the Insular Cases were not capital cases.
None of these distinctions is very convincing. Ross was a capital
case, and while it may have been based on the concern which
Americans felt for establishing some extraterritorial system of
justice in foreign countries to protect Americans abroad, that too
would seem in part to be the reason for the status of forces agree-
ments. Another reason for the status of forces agreements is to
assist in maintaining effective discipline in military communities
overseas, an additional reason for supporting the trial in Covert
that was lacking in Ross. Moreover, the procedural safeguards
established for the exercise of court martial jurisdiction by the Uni-
61. Id. at 14.
62. Id. at 35, n.63.
63. This limitation was relied on by one district judge who ruled that a
federal employee accompanying the armed forces overseas was subject to
court martial jurisdiction. See N.Y. Times, January 15, 1958, p. 14, col. 2. But
see United States ex rel. Smith v. Kinsella, No. 1963, S.D.W.Va., Aug. 1957
(overseas court martial of dependant for non-capital offense overturned).
64. Justice Harlan spells out the due process criterion somewhat more
explicitly than does Justice Frankfurter (see 354 U.S. at 75), but the same
rationale seems implicit in Justice Frankfurter's opinion. Id. at 44-46. Indeed
the only basic difference between the two opinions is their treatment of the
extent of the pre-constitutional precedent for court martial jurisdiction over
civilians. Compare 354 U.S. at 64, with id. at 70-71.
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form Code of Military Justice far exceed those prescribed by statute
for exercise of consular jurisdiction." As for the Insular Cases,
though the 1901 cases involved temporary government of territories
with wholly dissimilar traditions and institutions, Balzac v. Porto
Rico"6 came some twenty-four years after the occupation of the
territory concerned. 67 As for Madsen, Justice Black's footnote will
scarcely pass as a distinction. For Justice Black states in Reid v.
Covert:
The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its
power and authority have no other source.68 [footnote omitted]
If, then, the United States acts in enemy territory, it can on this
theory do so only as a result of some delegated power in the
Constitution. And whatever power is was that could support the
action in Madsen v. Kinsella, presumably the power of the president
as Commander-in-Chief, is not merely equally available in Reid v.
Covert, but is reinforced by the treaty making power and the right
of Congress to make regulations to govern the armed forces.
But whatever criticism one may have of justice Black's handling
of Madsen, he at least tries. Justice Frankfurter and Justice Harlan
instead simply ignore the case, though since it is a capital case
involving a civilian dependent accompanying the armed forces, it
seems squarely in point. In both Madsen and Covert the support
for trial by a non-Article III court without grand or petit jury
depends on the president's power as Commander-in-Chief, the fifth
amendment exception for cases arising in the land or naval forces,
or constitutional non-applicability overseas. If anything, Madsen is
a stronger case for finding a violation of due process because in
Madsen the trial was by a military government court which the
Court treated as essentially equivalent to a military commission,6 9
and there are therefore none of the statutory safeguards which Con-
gress has provided for courts martial.70 Finally, the congressional
basis of the trial in Covert as compared with Madsen further makes
Covert an a fortiori case because it provides additional constitutional
65. Compare 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (Supp. IV, 1956), with 354 U.S.
at 62.
66. 258 U.S. 298 (1922).
67. The decision was unanimous; Justice Holmes did not join in the
opinion of the Court but concurred in the results.
68. 354 U.S. at 5-6.
69. Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 346 (1952).
70. Moreover, since Madsen, the Uniform Code of Military justice has
made substantial improvements in the safeguards afforded defendants facing
court martial. Compare 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (Supp. IV, 1956), wits
Articles of War, 10 U.S.C. §§ 1471-1521 (1946). (The former supersedes
that latter.)
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support via the right of Congress to make regulations for the land
and naval forces.
As perplexing as the treatment of the relevant cases is the
failure to deal with the treaty making power as a basis on which to
sustain the trial in Covert, particularly since Justice Frankfurter
quotes the portion of Ross sustaining the treaty making power as an
affirmative constitutional grant of authority for the form of judicial
system established, 71 and Justice Black distinguishes Missouri v.
Holland on the ground that the treaty making power was an affirma-
tive grant of authority to the federal government vis a vis the
states.7 2 Since in both Covert and Krueger the crime is one that
otherwise would be tried by a court of the host country over which
the United States Constitution clearly does not extend, it is difficult
to see why the treaty making power does not constitute a relevant
constitutional basis of support for the form of trial chosen.
But if the two sets of views which result in the action of the
Court in Covert failed to cope with the precedents in terms of logic,
their failure is even greater in terms of the practicalities of the
situation. For the net result of Covert seems to be that in possessions
or occupied territories, over which the United States has virtually
absolute control, a comparatively easy test will be applied to United
States action; but in foreign countries, where United States control
is minimal and the United States is dependent upon the concurrence
of the foreign government, a very stringent standard is involved.
In the Girard case, the Court's brief per curiam opinion, whose
only citation is to a dictum in The Schooner Exchange v. McFad-
don,72 makes it exceedingly difficult to determine what the case holds
and what learning it brings to the subject of the relationship between
treaties and the Constitution. 74 If one assumes, as seems clear, that
the decision would have been the same had Girard been a draftee,
75
then the Court is holding that an American citizen can be compelled
to go to an area where the United States Government may force
him to stand trial without constitutional safeguards. To present the
proposition so starkly is to demonstrate that in extreme cases the
71. See 354 U.S. at 54-56, quoting In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 462-64(1891).
72. See Note 12 supra and related text.
73. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812).
74. Mfy criticism of this aspect of the case echoes an increasing number
of objections to what seems to be the Court's growing tendency to dispose
of cases on an dixit basis. See Sacks, Forward to The Supreme Court, 1953
Term, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 96, 103 (1954) ; Bickel and Wellington, Legislative
Purpose and the Judicial Process; The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 Harv. L. Rev.
1, 3-6 (1957).
75. See text at note 25, sutpra.
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action would be struck down ;76 it is only because of the existence
of a congeries of constitutional powers, presumably, in the case of
the status of forces agreements, the power to raise and support
armies, to make rules for their governance77 and the treaty making
power, that this may be done. Nor would it seem to be stretching
the Girard case to assert that if the accused were not a member of
the army but the wife of a member of the army who was a civilian
dependent overseas, the result would be the same. For it would
follow from the Girard case that the foreign country would have
had jurisdiction had it not been for the treaty, and since the treaty
provides for a waiver by the United States of whatever jurisdiction
is granted it, the dependent could be turned over by the United
States to the receiving country for the trial.7 8 Thus we reach the
conclusion that a dependent accompanying the armed forces can be
tried by foreign courts subject to no constitutional control and no
jurisdiction even to review on the part of the American constitu-
tional courts once the American involved is beyond the control of
American military authorities, but cannot be tried by an American
tribunal established under an Act of Congress providing for detailed
procedural safeguards,7 9 and subject to at least limited review by
constitutional courts. 80
This distinction between American tribunals on the one hand,
and foreign tribunals given jurisdiction by American action on the
other hand, is not new to the Court. In connection with post-World
War II war crimes trials a number of efforts were made to obtain
review in American courts of the war crimes tribunals' decisions. 8'
The problem reached the Supreme Court in a particularly acute
form in Hirota v. MacArthur,2 in which the tribunal was ex-
clusively American in composition and set up by the American
occupying authorities in Japan. However, the Court held that since
the tribunal was set up on behalf of all the allied powers, it was not
a United States tribunal and therefore was not subject to attack or
review in American courts despite its largely American character.
76. Extradition represents another similar situation, e.g., Charlton v.
Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913). But the Court has indicated that extradition
powers are not unlimited; see Valentine v. U.S. ex. rel Neidecker 299 U.S.
5, 9 (1936).
77. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 12-14.
78. In Covert, Justice Frankfurter did not appear to see any constitu-
tional difficulty in a foreign trial under such circumstances. See 354 U.S. at
48-49.
79. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 70A Stat. 36, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-
940 (Supp. IV, 1956).
80. Bums v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
81. These cases are detailed in Fairman, Some New Problems of the
Constitution Following the Flag, 1 Stan. L. Rev. 587 (1949).
82. 338 U.S. 197 (1948).
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This is a doctrine that probably cannot be pushed too far. Could
Covert, for instance, be overcome by drawing the status of forces
agreement so that in cases involving dependents the court martial,
though continuing to be composed entirely of Americans, sits as a
joint tribunal of both United States and the receiving country?
IV. INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS
A similar question currently arises as to the claims procedures
established under both the NATO and Japanese status of forces
agreements. Under both agreements, claims, other than contractual
claims arising from the performance of official duty by members of
visiting forces or their civilian components, causing damage to
parties other than the governments involved may be settled by the
receiving state or adjudicated in accordance with the laws and regu-
lations of the receiving state with respect to claims arising from the
activities of its own armed forces. Whether settled by adjudication
or negotiation, payment is made by the receiving state in its own
currency, and the sending state then reimburses the receiving state
for a portion of this payment.8 3 This formula obviously is subject to
attack on the basis of the Seery case. As in the agreement in Seery,
the claimant is prevented from proceeding against the United States
and must proceed against another country for payment in local
currency. Since a treaty supersedes a prior statute,8 4 the NATO
status of forces treaty will probably supply the necessary authority
to the United States, which was found lacking in Seery, for the
position that the sovereign's consent to sue the United States had
been withdrawn by the agreement and thus though the claimant may
have a valid constitutional objection to the treatment being afforded
him, he would have no forum in which to pursue it.85 With respect
to the Japanese agreement, this avenue of defense by the United
States is probably not available, as the Court of Claims views the
matter.86 In this situation, the Hirota type of defense may be sig-
nificant. In view of the fact that the Japanese government is to pay
twenty-five per cent of claims under the status of forces agreement
87
83. See Japanese Administrative Agreement, Article XVIII, Section 3;
NATO Status of Forces Treaty, Article VIII, Section 5.
84. See Foster v. Neilson 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314-15 (1829).
85. Hannevig v. United States, 114 Ct Cl. 410, 84 F. Supp. 743 (1949);
insofar as Etlimar Societe Anonyme of Casablanca v. United States, 123 Ct.
Cl. 552, 106 F. Supp. 191 (1952) holds that an executive agreement can
withdraw consent to sue, it was overruled by Seery.
86. Ibid.
87. Settlement of Costs for Claims Arising under Article XVIII of
the Administrative Agreement, March 23, 1953, 4 U.S. Treaties & Other Int'l
Agreements 355, T.I.A.S. No. 2783; the NATO Status of Forces Treaty,
Article VIII, provides a similar division of liability.
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it could well be argued that such claims do not arise exclusively
against the United States but have the sort of multi-national flavor
a la Hirota that forestalled the jurisdiction of the American courts
in that case.
Another limitation on the Seery case has been suggested; it is
asserted that Seery actually involves two separate takings, the first
being the actual use of the foreign property by the American govern-
ment and the second being the agreement which relegates the
claimant to the foreign government for satisfaction.88 It is contended
that the Seery case should be limited to the first of these takings,
and that the case should be inapplicable to an agreement between a
foreign government and the United States settling an expropriation
claim in which the United States may accept a payment somewhat
less than the actual value of the property taken and foreclose Ameri-
can citizens from having any claim against the foreign government.80
Another distinction of the Seery case based on this concept of two
takings may also be suggested, that presented by the NATO or the
Japanese agreement where the claims procedure is established prior
to the taking by use. In such a case it may well be argued that the
claims agreement is a matter of internal law in the receiving country
determining what the consequences of property ownership are, so
that, when the United States subsequently takes the property by
use, the consequence of property ownership is merely to have a claim
to be settled in accordance with the claims procedure. In other
words, in Seery, the United States was trying by executive agree-
ment to take away a right which had already vested against the
United States9" whereas no such vested right would exist in the
case proposed.
88. Oliver, Executive Agreements and Emanations fron the Fifth
Anendment, 49 Am. J. of Int'l L. 362 (1955).
89. Ibid. Cf. Gray v. United States, 21 Ct. Cl. 340 (1886). Perhaps the
distinction is whether the United States ultimately makes a bona fide effort to
recover on the claim (in which case, since such a claim is a normal matter for
settlement by international agreement, the treaty making power affords ade-
quate support for the agreement, even though a portion of the claimant's
claim is abandoned against his will) or surrenders the claim for some other
concession (in which case the right to just compensation predominates). The
existence of a remedy for a claimant who contends that the United States
in settling his claim against another government has, in effect, taken his
property without just compensation, may well have been withdrawn by 28
U.S.C. § 1502. The Seery decision does not appear to consider whether an
executive agreement would be affected by this provision. Of course, it only
becomes relevant if the taking is considered to be by the agreement, rather
than by the original use of the property by the army in the Seery case, and
the failure to consider 28 U.S.C. § 1502 is strong evidence that the court
of claims considered the use rather than the agreement to constitute the taking.
90. And which was really intangible personalty whose situs was
American, particularly since Mrs. Seery was an American national and resi-
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One cannot conclude this brief discussion of the constitutional
status of international agreements relating to claims settlements
without some consideration of the Pink case. 91 Under the so-called
Litvinov Assignment, the Russian Communist Government assigned
to the United States all amounts admitted to be due or that might
be found to be due to the Communist Government from American
nationals, including corporations and other entities. This fund was
to be applied against claims of American nationals against Russia.
Although the assignment on its face hardly compels such a con-
clusion, the Court interpreted it and the recognition of the Soviet
government as purporting to validate the nationalization decrees of
the Soviet government. Prior to the Litvinov Assignment, the New
York Court of Appeals had directed the State Banking Commis-
sioner to pay from the remaining proceeds 92 of a Russian insur-
ance company claims of certain foreign, but non-Russian creditors,
and to pay any surplus to the board of directors of the company.
This order was based on the theory that the public policy of New
York forbade recognition of foreign nationalization decrees with
respect to property having a New York situs. Some payment was
made to foreign creditors, but payment of the major portion of
claims that had been allowed was stayed when the Federal govern-
ment intervened and claimed the funds on the basis of the Litvinov
Assignment.
The opinion of the Court took the position that the president's
power to recognize foreign governments and to try to maintain
friendly relations with them encompassed the right to ratify foreign
nationalization decrees, at least as to non-Americans, and involved
a matter of federal supremacy before which the state policy must
bow.
It is obvious that this opinion raises serious questions as to the
constitutional protection afforded property when the property be-
comes involved in international affairs. Most titles to property in
the United States are a matter of state law, and property in the
United States consists largely of rights and obligations fixed by the
state government, subject to the fourteenth amendment and certain
other constitutional protections. If, however, the Pink case were
read as holding that the treaty making power or the power of the
dent, and the claim could only be enforced in the Court of Claims. It must
be stated, however, that the opinion in Seery does not lend any support to such
a view of the matter, and seems to view the taking as one of tangible prop-
erty in Austria.
91. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
92. American creditors had already been paid.
842 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:825
1
president to conduct the foreign affairs of the United States permits
the president to override all state created titles and that such action
by the president does not constitute a violation of the fifth amend-
ment, then it could be argued that under the power of the president
to conduct foreign affairs he can bargain away or give away
property rights in the United States with impunity.9 3
Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion, apparently thought
that the nature of the property was such that to talk of situs was
unrealistic, 4 but with so much property today consisting of intan-
gible personalty this distinction is hardly reassuring. Another pos-
sible meaning of the case is merely to consider it as establishing a
priority for American claimants over foreign claimants.95 But it
must be noted that the Americans being protected were not creditors
of the same corporation but claimants of other property seized by the
Russians. Under these circumstances, it is something of an extension
of the cases dealing with state preference of local as opposed to
foreign creditors of a given corporation to argue that American
claimants may be preferred out of assets of a corpus with which
they never had any connection over foreign nationals who did have
claims against that corpus.96 However, the Court seems to be willing
to make such an extension, although its explanation of why the ex-
tension does not raise fifth amendment problems is not very
satisfactory. The court merely states that:
It matters not that the procedure adopted by the Federal Gov-
ernment is globular and involves a regrouping of assets. There
is no constitutional reason why this government need act as the
collection agency for nationals of other countries when it takes
steps to protect itself or its own nationals on external debts.
There is no reason why it may not, through such devices as the
Litvinov Assignment, make itself and its nationals whole from
the assets here before it permits such assets to go abroad in
satisfaction of claims of aliens made elsewhere and not incurred
in connection with business conducted in this country.917
The concept that assets in which an American national never
had a claim may be taken from foreigners who had a claim to them
in order to make whole the American loss suffered in some other
assets seized, seems to raise considerably more difficulties than
93. For such an interpretation, see, e.g., Note, 51 Yale L.J. 848, 853(1942).
94. See 315 U.S. at 234, 239.
95. By analogy with the argument that a state may protect a resident
creditor against creditors who are nationals of foreign countries since the
latter do not have the protection of the equal protection clause. See 315 U.S.
at 228.
96. Cf. 55 Harv. L. Rev. 864, 866 (1942).
97. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 228 (1942).
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Justice Douglas found, both as to due process and the just com-
pensation clause.9 Perhaps the most satisfactory reading of Pink
is to ignore the reasoning of the case and simply classify it with
those cases that permit the federal government to override by ex-
ecutive agreement or treaty state-given property rights only when
the state determination of title turns on foreign policy matters. 99
But even this resolution is an uneasy one, since in these earlier cases
the treaty merely served to prevent escheat.
A comparison of Pink with Seery discloses some anomalies. In
Pink, it is held that by executive agreement the United States may
validate action of a foreign country as to the status of property
having an American situs despite state law to the contrary. In
Seery, however, it is held that an executive agreement with a
foreign government is incapable of giving effect to a determination
as to the status of property within the foreign country's own
borders.10 0 Since applicability of the just compensation clause does
not depend on whether the claimant is a national of the United
States,' 0' Mrs. Seery's American citizenship is hardly a sufficient
distinction.
V. CONCLUSION
The failure of the Court in the Covert case to achieve an opinion
in which a majority of the Court could join indicates that the
problem of seeking to determine the relationship between treaties
and the Constitution is far from solved. It seems unlikely that the
rigid position taken by Justice Black, that the Constitution is
universally applicable abroad and, impliedly, that the treaty-making
power does not of itself supply constitutional support for a treaty
attacked on some other constitutional ground, will provide a solu-
tion. The problems of accommodating national sovereignty to a
world in which international cooperation becomes more and more
necessary cry out for a contrary solution. The Girard case is merely
98. Ibid. And see Chase, J., and Wilson, J., in Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S.(3 Dall.) 199, 245, 283 (1796). In that case the treaty preceded the Con-
stitution and the Bill of Rights and, though validated by Article VI, may not
have had to face scrutiny under the fifth amendment.
99. Compare Chirac v. Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259 (1817), in
which a treaty with France was held to overcome a state law providing for
escheat of lands held by French nationals under specified circumstances. See
also Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1879).
100. While it has been suggested that the Seery case can be analyzed
on the theory that the taken property had an American situs, the opinion of
the court of claims is not so sophisticated.
101. E.g., Turney v. United States, 126 Ct. Cl. 202, 115 F. Supp. 457
(1953).
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one example of the sort of accommodation that must be made. 02
Recognition of the treaty-making power and of the power of the
executive branch in foreign affairs as affirmative constitutional
support for treaties and agreements with foreign countries subject
to accommodation with, rather than automatic overruling by other
portions of the Constitution, seems warranted, particularly when an
agreement's primary effect is external to the continental United
States. In this process of accommodation, emphasis should be on
the fundamental structure of the government of the United States 0 3
and on fundamental human liberties rather than peculiar matters
of Anglo-Saxon procedure. Such ideas are not novel. They have
ample support in the applicable precedents, and the increasing
interdependence of nations would seem only to emphasize the
wisdom of this earlier solution to the problem.
102. A number of other proposed accommodations to foreign feelings
that raise constitutional problems have received publicity, notably the agree-
ment with Saudi Arabia as to the religious composition of, and observance by,
troops sent there by the United States; see N.Y. Times, Feb. 29, 1956, p. 4,
col. 3, and a proposed agreement with Spain regulating marriage between
Roman Catholics and Protestants; see N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 1954, p. 1, col. 4.
The latter agreement was apparently never executed. "Apparently" is used
because agreements affecting various facets of the status of forces are often
classified. See, eg., O'Brien v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 33 Lab. Cas. 71, 114
(No. 87-275, S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 1957).
103. Cf. Geofrey v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890).
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